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Post-apartheid South Africa is facing three major economic problems: (1) slack economic 
growth,  (2)  high  and  growing  unemployment  and  (3)  among  the  world’s  highest  income 
inequality  and  poverty  indices.  South  Africa  is  currently  caught  in  a  macro-economic 
straight-jacket  of  tight  monetary,  restrictive  fiscal  and  a  wage  policy  stance  that  raises 
NAIRU. The persistence of a sub-optimal ‘market constellation’ is created by an institutional 
setting of a non-accommodative Reserve Bank, a sectoral-regional and company level non-
coordinated  collective  bargaining  system,  an  austere  ‘sound  finance  regime’  of  public 
budgeting and the lack of any institution to co-ordinate macro-economic policy. To tailor a 
better  fitting  constellation,  a  social  contract  involving  major  reforms  in  macro-economic 
governance in South Africa is proposed.     
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One decade after South Africa’s peaceful transition from apartheid to a modern democracy 
and its development from an economy that was heavily distorted towards racial economic 
interests and isolated from the world economy (see Cassim 2006; Klaasen 2002) into a steady 
growing,  low  inflation  economy  fully  integrating  into  a  rapidly  globalising  world,  South 
African economic policy has made progress in microeconomic reforms, trade liberalisation 
and  raised  overall  economic  well-being  (see  e.g.  Frankel/Smit/Sturzenegger  2006). 
Nevertheless, three basic problems remain: (1) Unemployment is far too high and shows an 
upward  trend.  Official  rates  of  more  than  20  percent  and  unofficial  rates  well  above  30 
percent are clearly unacceptable.
1 (2) Income inequality and poverty rates are persistently 
among  the  highest  in  the  world  and  appear  to  have  worsened  over  the  last  decade.
2  (3) 
Economic growth has recovered from the slump of the 1980s but remains lower than it was in 
previous  decades,  and  much  lower  than  in  countries  which  have  converged  towards  the 
OECD average.
3 The seriousness of these three problems has been stated clearly than by the 
OECD  (2006:  461):  “…,  impatience  regarding  the  unequal  distribution  of  the  benefits  of 
growth appears to be building and could lead to political and social instability that would 
jeopardise these hard-won macroeconomic achievements.” 
 
These  three  problems  are  obviously  intertwined
4:  Low  growth  rates  directly  reflect  the 
disappointing employment performance. Countries that have lowered unemployment during 
the past decade (e.g. the USA and the UK) based their achievement on a growth recovery. 
High unemployment is the major driving forces for growing income inequality worldwide. 
Moreover,  high  income  inequality  and  poverty  are  a  severe  constraint  on  growth  and 
employment creation. In order to keep this paper concise, we will focus primarily on growth 
and employment – income inequality will be considered only marginally. 
 
Many factors impact on economic growth – particularly when Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
is considered in addition to the increased use of factors of production (capital and labour). 
South Africa’s growth problem lies not only in its low growth rate, but also in its composition 
(see Cassim 2006: 76): Capital accumulation and employment have contributed very little, yet 
TFP-growth  explains  most.  We  are  not  primarily  concerned  with  the  micro-economic 
determinants of the latter, but with the macro-economic potentials of the former. Let us start 
with  a  quick  refresher  of  the  traditional  links  between  micro  and  macro-economic 
performance in relation to investment and employment. 
                                                 
* This paper has been written while the author was a Visiting Professor at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. 
He  has  immensely  profited  from  the  invaluable  help  of  Basil  Moore  and  discussions  with  the  staff  of  the 
Economics Department at Stellenbosch University. However, the usual caveats apply. 
1 Official unemployment was 1.9 mill (= 16.7%) in 1995 and 4.2 mill (= 27.3) in 2002. Unofficial ‘under-
employment’ was 3.8 mill (= 29.1%) in 1995 and 7.3 mill (= 39.5%) in 2002; see Bhorat (2006: 276). For an 
extensive elaboration on the issue of South African unemployment; see Kingdom/Knight (2004). 
2 Agüero/Carter/May (2006) report an increase in most income inequality indices based on market income and a 
slight decline if redistributive effects of government transfer are included. 
3 While, for instance, GDP growth in China was 7.5% on average during the 1990s and 5.3% in Ireland, it was a 
mere 2.0% in South Africa; see Cassim (2006: 76). 
4 For an overview of the links see e.g. Khan (2005).   3 
            
2. Macro versus micro perspectives – shifting the focus 
 
The traditional story explaining South Africa’s economic problems is as follows: To create 
employment  without  inflationary  pressure,  extensive  growth  is  needed.  The  backbone  of 
economic growth is domestic and international savings which finance domestic and Foreign 
Direct  Investment  (FDI),  assuming  contested  commodity  markets,  liberalised  financial 
markets and deregulated labour markets. The latter is important to keep the natural rate of 
unemployment (NRU) and inflation low so long as the macro-economic policy environment is 
appropriate:  monetary  policy  should  be  assigned  to  maintain  price  stability  via  inflation 
targeting (‘sound money’), fiscal policy must remain sound by providing a ‘near to balanced 
budget’ (‘sound finance’). National and international liberalised financial markets will raise 
interest  rates  to  a  level  where  (national  and  international)  savings  suffice  to  finance 
investment to create sufficient jobs to achieve full employment and reduce income inequality 
to the level consistent with productivity requirements.   
 
The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy of the ANC government in 
1995 was designed to follow exactly these footprints
5 – footprints that have been dubbed 
‘neo-liberal’ in the mould of the infamous ‘Washington Consensus’ (see e.g. Epstein 2002, 
Ballard/Habib/Valodia  2006).  The  categorisation  of  GEAR  is  not  important,  but  its 
achievements, as we have seen, have not lived up to its promises. Three separate reasons have 
been given for this under-achievement: (1) The ‘more of the same’ argument contends that 
commodity markets – particularly in sectors where former state monopolies and utilities had 
been privatised – are not sufficiently open and contested enough to produce the dynamics 
necessary to attract sufficient investment (see e.g. Cassim 2006, Naidoo 2006). The labour 
market has been unduly regulated by post-apartheid legislation with the result that the labour 
supply  is  inappropriate  for  a  take  off  (see  e.g.  Bhorat  2006).  (2)  The  ‘inequality  trap’ 
argument  maintains  that  income  and  wealth  inequality  have  surpassed  a  threshold  level, 
settling  the  economy  in  a  low-growth  equilibrium.  Without  a  more  equal  distribution  of 
financial, real and human capital and the income accruing from it, capital accumulation and 
growth can not rise because low-wealth and low-income households are unable to borrow and 
domestic  demand  is  insufficient  for  a  higher  growth  equilibrium  (see  e.g.  Carter  2006, 
Murphy/Shleifer/Vishny 1989). (3) The macro-economic coat tailored by GEAR under the 
present institutional framework is too tight for more rapid economic growth – forcing the 
economy  into  an  ongoing  ‘suppressed  expansion’,  as  the  European  Union  (particularly 
Germany) experienced on its way to monetary union in the 1990s (Heise 2002). 
 
The micro-economic explanation of (1) relies on the NRU-, the ‘savings fountain-’ and the 
exogenous-money-hypothesis  of  mainstream  economics.  Explanation  (2)  can  be 
complemented with macro-economic explanation (3) based on Post Keynesian theory. We 
will concentrate on this latter explanation keeping in mind Naidoo’s (2006: 108) statement: 
“Macroeconomic stability is a necessary condition for faster economic growth; it is, however, 
not a sufficient condition for higher growth”. No one would deny that the micro-economic, 
supply-side  factors  in  (1)  and  (2)  are  important.  But  attention  should  be  focused  on  the 
necessary conditions.
6          
                                                 
5 The ANC started in the 1994 elections with a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was 
negotiated with the Confederation of South Africa’s Trade Unions (COSATU) and which has been described as 
“…COSATU’s vision of a socialist South Africa” (Venter 2003: 137). Once in office the ANC soon changed 
course from RDP to GEAR; see e.g. May/Carter/Padayachee (2004: 19).  
6 There is some agreement that macro-economic stability (in the ‘Washington Consensus’ sense) was the primary 
aim of the first years of South Africa’s transition after apartheid, and micro-economic reforms should be the new   4 
  
Post  Keynesian  authors  emphasize  the  importance  of  effective  demand  (constraints)  in 
determining the overall volume of employment (and, hence, unemployment) independent of 
labour market failures.
7 Although Post Keynesianism is not yet a well defined and coherent 
body of economic theory (see e.g. Dunn 2000; Holt/Pressman 2001), some basic features 
stand out: 
 
•  Before we are able to study allocative processes on single markets (i.e. the optimal use 
of given resources in partial analysis), we must determine the extent to which resources 
will be used (i.e. the degree of utilisation in total analysis) in the aggregate. This is most 
important for the factor of production which may be taken as given (i.e. constant) in the 
short run and which is as much a social category as a factor of production: labour supply, 
i.e. the number of human beings willing (or forced) to sell their services to companies and 
employers and being mostly harmed if they do not succeed – there is no such thing as a 
‘natural rate of (un)employment’. 
•  The environment under  which economic agents  act is a fundamentally uncertain 
one. That is to say, that economic agents will never be able to dispose, collect nor process 
all the information that is necessary for optimal decisions featuring so prominently in 
neoclassical general equilibrium (GE) models. Nevertheless, in order to decide (bounded) 
rationally,  economic  agents  need  rules  and  regulations,  habits,  codes  of  conduct  and 
various institutions to reduce the number of possible alternatives.  
•  Money features prominently in Post Keynesian economics. Money is the institution in 
which  not  only  spot  transactions  (barter)  are  denominated  but  also  such  transactions 
which are basic constituents to capitalistic economic behaviour:  forward looking debt 
relations involving debtors and creditor. The decision to dispose with money (liquidity 
preference) for a certain period of time (into the uncertain future), i.e. to invest and create 
debtor-creditor-relationships, drives an economy. Therefore, the endogenous supply of 
money is always credit-driven.  
•  In  neoclassical  barter  or  real  exchange  models,  all  markets  are  equivalent  and  the 
Walrasian ‘law of markets’ accounts for an ever equilibrating process. This is not the case 
in a monetary production economy which is characterised by a hierarchy of markets: the 
motives and (trans)actions of agents (creditors and debtors) on credit markets logically 
proceed the (trans)actions on commodity and labour markets and, thereby, set budget 
constraints for all other market actors: in Keynes’s terminology, it is the ‘finance motive’ 
providing the (liquidity preference) foundation of the investment and income generating 
production process (Davidson 1994: 86ff.).  This reverses the savings-investment nexus 
(see Moore 2006). 
•  There is neither a single reference point towards which capitalist economies tend to 
move (no general equilibrium but multiple equilibria) nor a hydraulic way of governing 
an economy as ‘old fashioned’ standard Keynesianism seemed to believe in the 1960s and 
1970s.  Different  sets  of  institutions,  political  and  cultural  factors  and  historical 
circumstances (such as international monetary systems and degrees of market saturation) 
                                                                                                                                                         
primary target; see e.g. Carter (2006), Naidoo (2006), Cassim (2006). We do not subscribe to this interpretation 
and re-emphasize the need for macro-economic stability (in a pro-growth interpretation). The point is to accept a 
Washington Consensus interpretation of macro-economic stability for an introductory period of transition (in 
order to gain confidence on international financial markets), and then to stress the need for a more growth- and 
employment-oriented interpretation of macro-economic stability. 
7  Income  distribution  and  fundamental  uncertainty  resulting  in  liquidity  preference  considerations  play 
prominent parts in different  Post Keynesian approaches;  for a quick overview of Post Keynesian  views on 
unemployment see King (2001)   5 
determine ‘market constellations’
8 under which economic agents act and which show 
some persistence. The political actor (government) and other corporatist actors (such as 
social partners or Central Banks) are the agents of economic policy in a wider sense, and 
can  in  no  way  be  regarded  as  ‘exogenous’  to  market  processes.  They  do  not  simply 
correct ‘market failures’ in a quasi-functional way but are rather market participants – 
important  and  powerful  –  faced  with  uncertain  future  developments  and  events  and 
contingent  reactions  of  other  market  participants.  The  contingency  of  economic 
governance is more obvious once the assumption of a unitary political actor is abandoned. 
If  the  key  macroeconomic  policy  fields  of  monetary,  fiscal  and  wage  policies  are 
controlled  by  independent  actors,  and  an  interdependence  of  these  policy  fields  is 
assumed, the actors operate in a strategic environment where the policy outcome depends 
on the expectations and anticipations of each other, and the impact of particular policies 
depend on the expectations and anticipations of individual market actors.  
 
The following analysis is built on Post Keynesian macro theory. A market participation theory 
of  economic  policy  will  be  outlined  in  broad  strokes  and  a  cooperative  approach  to 
macroeconomic policy-making portrayed. This determines the way macroeconomic demand 
management is used to manipulate ‘market outcomes’ in a systematic but not hydraulic way. 
As  a  further  step,  we  will  inquire  how  far  macroeconomic  governance  can  explain  the 
insufficient growth and employment experience of post-apartheid South Africa. Or to put it 
differently: what can be done to create more favourable ‘market constellations’? 
 
3.  Market  participation  and  the  creation  of  favourable  ‘market 
constellations’: some conceptual ideas 
 
Once the idea of a general equilibrium as the natural long-term position of any economy is 
replaced  by  a  notion  of  multiple  equilibria,  unemployment  becomes  a  systematic 
characteristic  of  decentralised  market  economies  as  opposed  to  merely  being  a  ‘market 
failure’.  Therefore,  economic  policy  towards  establishing  full  employment  is  not solely  a 
functional device of ‘market creation’ and ‘market repair’ but must be established by political 
will  (normative  target)  and  can  only  be  pursued  by  participating  in  the  market  process. 
Therefore, the political actor is not a subject external to the market participants (objects) but a 
market participant (object) himself who is constrained by market forces just like any other 
market  participant.  Governmental  (and  other  corporatist  actors)  interventions  will  have 
measurable impacts on quantities and prices. But as any other market participant, the political 
(or corporatist) actor must finally accept market outcomes, i.e. cannot ex ante discriminate 
between  warranted  quantity  and  unwarranted  price  effects.  However,  there  are  means  to 
reduce the magnitude of contingency (or lack of sharpness in policy control) by introducing 
(codified)  rules  and  regulations  or  developing  or  stimulating  institutions  that  reduce  the 
available number of options for market participants and, therefore, decrease the uncertainty 
about future actions. Obviously, there is a trade-off between transaction costs (due to the need 
to adapt to changing market situations) and uncertainty costs – so the optimal mix of ‘laissez-
faire’  and  ‘regulation’  is  open  to  experience.    Yet,  uncertainty-reducing  institutions  and 
regulations are much easier to justify in a Post Keynesian framework than in a neoclassical 
theory of ‘market failure’ (see e.g. Kregel 1980, Hodgson 1989). The goal is to create a 
‘market constellation’ favourable to growth and employment. 
                                                 
8 The term ‘market constellation’ sounds surely unfamiliar to most readers. It is intended to capture specific 
market outcomes which are determined by certain formal and informal institutions. An alternative term used for 
the combination of institutions and outcomes is ‘regimes’ – but as this termed as been appropriated by certain 
schools of though (the French ‘Regulation’ school and the American ‘Social Structure of Accumulation’ school), 
we would like to keep the somewhat cumbersome ‘market constellation’ term for distinction.    6 
 
Some of these uncertainty-reducing institutions – with particular respect to our purpose – are 
collective  bargaining  systems,  institutional  settings  of  Central  Banks  and  institutional 
structures to coordinate different independent but interdependent political actors to establish 
an optimal policy mix. Collective bargaining systems can provide the necessary ‘nominal 
anchor’  in  modern  (fiat  money)  currency  systems,  the  Central  Bank  design  is  critical  in 
securing the scarcity of paper money. Both institutional set ups reduce otherwise precarious 
volatility of (nominal) wages and prices: It has become common sense that there is a strong 
correlation  between  the  degree  of  independence  of  Central  Banks  and  the  inflation 
performance of an economy on the one hand and likewise a correlation between inflation 
performance and inflation volatility. There is less agreement about the influence of collective 
bargaining systems on wage settlements and inflation. An influential study by Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988) propose a ‘hump-shaped’ link while other evidence (e.g. Soskice 1990) suggest 
a negative correlation: the more decentralised the collective bargaining system is, the higher 
will be wage settlements and inflation rates.
9 Be it as it may, there is no doubt that collective 
bargaining institutions and the Central Banking design may impinge in a systematic way on 
the degree of uncertainty about inflation developments and the valuation of assets.  
 
Recently the mutual causality (Wechselwirkung in a Kantian sense; see Hicks 1979: 18f.)) of 
collective bargaining systems and Central Banking designs has been studied in depth, and the 
‘conventional  wisdom’  about  the  (long  term)  neutrality  of  monetary  policy  and  the  ‘free 
lunch’ assumption of Central Bank independence has been shaken
10. Moreover, it has been 
asked whether it is sensible to delegate half of demand management to an autonomous body 
such  as  the  Central  Bank  (see  Rankin  1998,  Power/Rowe  1998)  –  creating  a  possible 
coordination problem between fiscal and monetary policies (see Nordhaus 1994). Both lines 
of discussion can be joined by  realising that all actors involved – the  political actor, the 
Central  Bank  and  the  social  partners  –  pursue  individual  utility  maximisation  under  the 
constraint
11 of a Phillips curve trade-off
12, but may (and most certainly will) have different 
preferences with respect to inflation and unemployment. In a moment, we will see how this 
can evolve into a policy game which leaves not only the actors involved dissatisfied but also 
produces  a  sub-optimal  result  in  terms  of  overall  welfare.  Therefore,  if  institutions  that 
produce incentives for the actors involved – the political actor responsible for fiscal policy, 
the Central Bank responsible for monetary policy and the social partners responsible for wage 
policy – to cooperate may be able to create market constellations favourable for more rapid 
growth and employment.  
 
3.1. The monetary-fiscal policy game 
 
Since a three actor’s game is too complex to be exposed, it will be split into two separate 
games in which the Central Bank is the connecting piece. This seems appropriate since it is 
the Central Bank’s monetary policy which is the mutual focus of both wage policy and fiscal 
                                                 
9 This relation becomes plausible if we assume strong trade unions at company level (‚local pushfullness’) and a 
signalling function of the wage settlements of ‘key companies’ (i.e. bigger, more visible companies).  
10 See e.g. Hall/Franzese (1998), Guzzo/Velasco (1999), Cukierman/Lippi (1999), Iversen (1999a). The ‘free 
lunch’ assumption has been particularly discussed by Grilli/Masciandaro/Tabellini (1991), Gärtner (1997), Posen 
(1998), Soskice/Iversen (2000).  
11 At least in the  short run,  there seems  to be consensus  about the existence of this trade-off among  most 
economic schools. In the long run, the trade off is acknowledge by Post Keynesian theories but questioned by 
neo-classical theories. However, as the time horizon for political action can be assumed as being rather short 
term, this dispute need not be decided here. 
12 In case of the social partners, the original Phillips curve (linking nominal wages increases to unemployment) is 
important.   7 
policy alike, but there is no direct interaction between the latter two. Let us start with the 
interaction of monetary and fiscal policy as portrayed in the so called Nordhaus-model (see 
Nordhaus 1994 or Balls/O’Donnell 2002: 101ff.): We assume that (1) the utility functions of 
both  actors  include  the  variables  ‘unemployment’  and  ‘inflation’,  (2)  both  actors  show 
different preferences with respect to unemployment and inflation (the Central Bank is more 
averse to inflation than the political actor), (3) there is a (short and long term) Phillips curve 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation, (4) both actors target a (different) volume of 
aggregate demand in order achieve the preferred combination of unemployment and inflation, 
and (5) the political actor additionally puts emphasis on the budgetary balance as it provides 
the means to offer public goods  to the electorate (necessary to secure re-election). In fig. 1, 
the M and F curve portray the level of aggregate demand which the Central Bank (M) and the 
political actor (F) target respectively. They can do so by choosing a policy mix of monetary 
and fiscal policy here approximated by the instrument variables i (real interest rate) and S 
(budgetary  balance):  the  same  aggregate  demand  can  be  achieved  through  a  more 
expansionary  monetary  policy  and  tighter  fiscal  policy  (i.e.  lower  i  and  higher,  or  more 
positive, S) or, alternatively, through a more restrictive monetary policy in combination with a 
more expansionary fiscal policy (i.e. higher i and lower, or more negative, S).    
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The  difference  between  the  M  and  F  curve  reflects  the  autonomous  relevance  that  fiscal 
policy (budgetary balance S) has for the political actor. Point A and B represent the ‘optimal’ 
combinations of fiscal and monetary policy as preferred by the Central Bank and the political 
actor: as the Central Bank is more averse to inflation than the political actor, it favours point 
B at tighter monetary policy and the political actor favours point A at more expansionary 
monetary policy and higher budget deficits (as expression of the desire to have more room to 
manoeuvre). Obviously, both points A and B cannot be realised at the same time: either, there 
is some kind of coordination between fiscal and monetary policy and some point C on the 
contract curve will eventually be reached
13 or, in the case of conflict (or non-cooperation), we 
will end up at point D – which is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium – or at point E which is 
a Stackelberg equilibrium
14. Whether the cooperative point C will be preferred as compared to 
the non-cooperative points D and E depends on the preference structure of both actors: The 
more averse to inflation the Central Bank and averse to unemployment the political actor, the 
less likely it will be that the cooperative point C will be preferred (see Heise 2001: 62ff.).       
 
3.2. The monetary-wage policy game 
 
At this point, we are not concerned about (institutional) incentives necessary to increase the 
likelihood  of  cooperation  (see  Heise  2001:  73ff.)  but  will  pose  the  question  whether  the 
underlying conflict can be mitigated by bringing the social partners into the picture. Indeed, 
this would be the case, if the social partners were able to prevent inflationary developments to 
accompany increasing employment – i.e. if they were able to suppress the Phillips curve logic. 
As the Phillips curve is based on the ‘original Phillips curve’ linking inversely nominal wage 
increases to falling unemployment, social partners may well have a stake in the game. From a 
large  number  of  studies
15  we  know  that  the  potential  to  control  the  Phillips  curve  logic 
depends on the ability  of the social partners to create external effects  (i.e. nominal wage 
claims in excess of the distributional margin given by labour productivity growth and the 
targeted inflation rate) and the willingness to internalise such external effects: decentralised 
collective  bargaining  systems  (acting  at  company  level)  are  said  neither  to  expose  a 
willingness to internalise external effects nor to have the ability to create such external effects 
(Calmfors-Driffill  case).  Centralised  collective  bargaining  systems
16,  in  which  the  social 
partners (and, most importantly the trade unions) act as ‘encompassing organisations’, do 
have the ability to create external effects but will also be willing to internalise them. They will 
do  so  once  they  have  realised  that  any  nominal  wage  increase  will  (ceteris  paribus)  be 
completely passed on to prices and leave the real wages unaltered. Intermediate collective 
bargaining systems (acting at regional or sectoral level), however, have the ability to create 
external effects, yet they are not willing to internalise them as the effect of the nominal wage 
increases on the overall price level will be a restricted one (for the restricted scope – regional 
or sectoral – of their bargaining power) and, hence, enables them to alter their (sectoral or 
regional) real wage rate
17. This may also be the case with respect to decentralised collective 
                                                 
13 Where exactly on the contract curve such a cooperative point C will come to lie depends on bargaining 
position of both actors. This position is determined by the preference structure of the actors. 
14 A Stackelberg equilibrium can easily be imagined if the political actors accept the structural strength of the 
central bank to enforce its level of aggregate demand, although it maintains the enforcement of its preferred 
budgetary balance.  
15 See e.g. Franzese (2002); Hall (1994), Hall/Franzese (1998), Iversen (1999b), OECD (1997). 
16 Centralisation means that the collusion of heterogeneous interests into credible commitments is possible; i.e. 
decentralised but highly cooperative trade unions and employers’ organisations may be de jure decentralised but 
act de facto as a centralised collective bargaining system in the above sense.   
17 Soskice (2000: 47) spells out the necessary, yet realistic assumptions: (1) industrial trade unions indeed only 
care about employment and wages of the labour force in their own sector , (2) they bargain independently.   9 
bargaining  systems  if  we  allow  for  signalling  effects  of  key  companies  and  ‘local 
pushfullness’, i.e. strong and myopic trade unions at company level (Soskice case).     
 

































Fig. 2 depicts the different settings: w
r
b is the real wage rate which trade unions (as the crucial 
part  of  the  social  partners  in  this  argument)  are  targeting
18  with  respect  to  the  level  of 
employment. LF is the labour force which is, for the sake of simplicity, taken as given. w
r
p is 
the  real  wage  rate  which  the  employers  are  willing  to  accept  (which  is  given  by  labour 
productivity  growth  and  a  mark-up  accounting  for  imperfect  competition  on  commodity 
markets).  In the case of a centralised bargaining system, for a considerable margin trade 
unions  are  willing  and  able  to  suppress  the  ‘Phillips  curve  logic’  –  from  a  level  of 
employment L
N
1 onwards, they will not ask for higher (targeted) real wages but increase the 
utility  of  the  labour  force  (as  their  political  aim)  by  increasing  employment.  Above 
employment  level  L
N
2,  which  can  be  interpreted  as  the  point  at  which  the  number  of 
unemployed equals the number of vacancies, real wages will start to increase either through 
higher collective claims or by way of wage drift. Below employment level L
N
1, pressure on 
trade unions will force them to accept lower (targeted) real wage increases than employers 
would be willing to pay at full employment levels.  
 
3.3. Macro-economic policy games in different institutional embedding – the case for 
market constellations 
 





2 depends on implicit or explicit coordination mechanisms: 1) if an institution – a concerted 
action,  a  social  contract  or  macro-dialogue  –  empowers  the  actors  involved  to  credibly 
commit  themselves  to  pre-established  policy  rules,  the  Central  Bank  may  be  willing  and 
forced to allow for a level of aggregate demand which reflects the preferences of the political 
actor and the social partners - L
N
2 in this case. 2) If the Central Bank pursues a monetary 
policy  of  ‘testing  the  waters’
19  and  the  political  actor  and  the  social  partners  can  bring 
themselves not to exploit the Central Bank’s pragmatism, L
N
2 may also be reached – this may 
be termed the ‘Fed strategy’ for it has allegedly been the policy stance of the US Federal 
                                                 
18 ‘Targeting real wages’ means that trade unions bargain nominal wages under the expectation of price inflation. 
The assumption is that their expectations are met, i.e. no revision of plans is necessary. 
19 ‘Testing the waters’ means that Central Banks risk expanding monetary policy as long as no inflation potential 
arises.    10 
Reserve Board during the 1990s (see Blinder/Yellen 2001: 35ff.; Bibow 2001). Almost the 
same scenario would be imaginable if the political actor was to take the more active (fiscal) 
policy stance,  yet the Central Bank would not react in a restrictive manner but allow for 
aggregate demand to increase (i.e. any point on the contract curve in fig. 1). However, these 
options seem to be a very fragile and rather coincidental cooperation (see e.g. Horn 1999; 
Fritsche et al. 2005: 102f.) as the incentives for the actors involved not to defect (i.e. not to 
exploit) are not very strong – that at least is what game theory teaches us. 3) If cooperation 
cannot be established, the Central Bank will enforce its level of aggregate demand (at Nash- 
or Stackelberg  equilibrium) preventing employment from rising  above  L
N
1 – this may be 
termed the ‘Bundesbank strategy’ for it has been allegedly the policy stance of the German 
Bundesbank ever since it pursued an independent monetary policy (see Hein 2002a). 4) If the 
Central  Bank  were  to  accommodate  whatever  wage  and  fiscal  policy  stance
20,  again  L
N
2 
would be at reach, yet at a comparably high inflation rate (the exact amount of which depends 
on the inflation aversion of the social partners; see Guzzo/Velasco 1999, Hall/Franzese 2000).       
 
Table  1:  Unemployment  and  inflation  in  various  market  constellations  –  a  broad 
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As  is  summarized  in  tab.1,  the  market  outcomes  look  quite  different  when  we  focus  on 
decentralised, non-coordinated (company or industry level) collective bargaining systems: (1) 
If  the  Central  Bank  accommodates  whatever  wage  claims  and  fiscal  policy  stance,  the 
inflation rate will certainly be very high and possibly accelerating. As high inflation rates are 
typically associated with high inflation volatility, liquidity preference considerations of wealth 
owners  will  curtail  investment  spending,  economic  growth  and  employment  –  hence, 
employment will be below L
N
2 , but probably above the level which a non-accommodating 
Central Bank under ‘Bundesbank strategy’ would enforce; for instance at level L
N
4 . (2) A 
                                                 
20 In this case, the Central Bank either shows a low degree of independence or is led by a ‚populist Central 
Banker’ (as compared to the ‘conservative Central Banker’ of price stability orientation).   11 
(explicitly) cooperative constellation including a non-accommodating Central Bank and non-
coordinated social partners is hard to imagine as the number of actors (particularly on the side 
of the social partners) is too numerous for a strategic and credible commitment. (3) In case of 
a  non-accommodating  Central  Bank,  the  result  will  be  high  unemployment  (L
N
3)  in 
combination with low inflation whatever the Central Bank strategy is.
21 This is at least true as 
long  as  we  assume  an  intermediate  bargaining  level  (industry  or  region)  or  ‘local 
pushfullness’  at  company  level  (i.e.  the  Soskice  case).  (4)  Only  under  the  condition  of 
‘marginalised’,  decentralised  social  partners  (i.e.  the  Calmfors-Driffill  case)  and  a  ‘Fed 




2 – the exact position of the w
r
b 
curve (in fig. 2) depends on the extent of ‘marginalisation’
22. Nevertheless, this is likely to be 
an unstable constellation once disinflationary developments turn into a deflationary process 
due to the lack of a nominal anchor
23.            
           
Tab.  1  captures  possible  outcomes  for  employment  and  inflation  under  different  market 
constellations which depend on collective bargaining systems, Central Banking designs and 
explicit  or  implicit  mechanisms  of  coordination  between  the  key  macroeconomic  policy 
fields. Assuming that the individual members of a society receive positive utility from low 
inflation and high employment (or, rather, low unemployment), it becomes clear that a non-
accommodative monetary policy, either under the ‘Fed strategy’ or in cooperative orientation, 
coupled  with  a  centralised  collective  bargaining  system  provides  the  best  and  preferred 
market  constellations.  The  outcomes  of  tab.  1  also  make  it  clear  why  we  get  a  rather 
unambiguous  picture  with  concern  to  a  positive  correlation  between  ‘Central  Bank 
independence’ (non-accommodation) and ‘inflation’ on the one hand and why it is so difficult 
to establish a significant correlation between ‘Central Bank independence’ and ‘disinflation 
cost’ in terms of the sacrifice ratio on the other hand (see e.g. Alesina/Summers 1993), if 
different institutional settings are not being controlled for.   
 
4. Putting post-apartheid South Africa into place 
 
The  questions  to  be  answered  now  are:  ‘Does  the  market  constellation  approach  produce 
sensible results for South Africa’? ‘Where does South Africa fit into the picture’? In order to 
find answers, we must first paint a broad picture of South Africa’s institutional setting in the 
field of monetary, fiscal and wage policies.  
 
4.1. South Africa’s Central Bank design 
 
The  above  exposed  conceptual  framework  has  been  tested  on  several  highly  developed 
countries (se e Heise 2006, Heine/Herr/Kaiser 2006) but not on emerging market economies 
(EME). Although differences may have to be taken into consideration, the general approach 
appears to be independent of the stage of development of an economy: the equilibrium growth 
path  depends  crucially  on  the  institutional  setting  of  the  macro-economic  governance 
                                                 
21 This scenario can be interpreted as a Post Keynesian ‘conflicting claims’ version of the Non-Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU); see e.g. Bhaduri (2000: 18ff.). 
22 ‚Marginalisation’ would be complete – and thus, the w
r
b curve would cut the w
r
p curve at point L
N
2 – if the 
actors on the labour market were pure ‘price takers’.   




p but definitely no 
equilibrium  nominal  wage  rate.  Yet,  the  ghost  of  deflation  can  possibly  be  banned  however,  if  demand-
management will be used efficiently to control employment levels and/or downward barriers to nominal wage 
decline – such as effective minimum wages – are introduced.    12 
structure.
24 South Africa’s government granted the Reserve Bank of South Africa (SARB) full 
institutional and instrumental independence
25. Yet the government has retained the right to set 
the target(s): the Reserve Bank is required to strive for price stability as measured by a range 
of  3%  to  6%  of  CPIX  (consumer  price  index  excluding  mortgage  price  costs).  As  is 
commonly the case, a second subordinated target is set by pursuing the goal of balanced 
economic development and growth, once price stability is not in jeopardy. Since 2000, the 
SARB  conceptually  followed  an  inflation  targeting  (IT)  strategy  which  is  particularly 
designed to address the monetary policy problems of transparency and credibility (see e.g. 
Aron/Muellbauer/Smit 2003: 5ff.). Ian Plenderleith (2003), then Deputy Governor of SARB, 
argued that it is even more critical and crucial for monetary policy in EME’s (as compared to 
OECD  countries)  to  convey  the  appropriate  signals  to  economic  agents  so  as  to  gain 
credibility  in  achieving  price  stability.  To  put  it  differently:  it  is  difficult  to  gain  trust, 
particularly  for  Central  Banks  in  transitional  economies,  yet  this  trust  is  easily  lost. 
Aron/Muellbauer (2006: 12, my italics) pinpoint the problem involved as follows: “The cost 
of expectations not being anchored to the target is that a more aggressive monetary policy 
may  be  required  to  gain  credibility  for  the  central  bank  and  its  price  stabilising  goal”. 
Translated into the  categories of our broad institutional design board,  monetary policy in 
South  Africa  must  not  only  be  judged  as  ‘non-accommodating’,  but  an  uncompromising 
‘Bundesbank strategy’ can be assumed.
26 
 
4.2. South Africa’s collective bargaining framework 
 
Industrial relations and the collective bargaining system underwent considerable change in 
post-apartheid South Africa. South Africa has traditionally been a country with strong trade 
unions – in 2004 about 20% of the economically active population, but roughly 45% of the 
employees in the formal, non-agricultural sectors were Trade Union members
27. Moreover, 
the incumbent ANC government can be expected to have enhanced the position of its former 
allies in opposition to Apartheid. With the enacting of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) in 
1995, collective bargaining centralisation and a consensus-oriented employment system was 
promoted (see Nel 2002: 161). Collective and Statutory Councils replaced former Industrial 
Councils which served discrimination and oppression under Apartheid (see Madden 2006: 
51).  Collective  and  Statutory  Councils  conclude,  administer  and  enforce  collective 
agreements  at  the  regional  and  industry-level,  they  also  provide  dispute  resolution  and 
administer social benefit funds  (see Madden 2006). They  are jointly set up under certain 
conditions  of  representation  by  Trade  Unions  and  Employers’  Organisations  (Bargaining 
Councils) or can be established by the government under request of one of the two industrial 
relations  parties  involved  (Statutory  Councils)  if  the  other  party  tries  to  block  the 
establishment of a  Bargaining Council.  In 2004, 58 Bargaining Councils (see SAS 2006) 
covered about 25% of employees in the formal sector (see Madden 2005). However, their 
reach goes far beyond those directly covered since collective agreements have been extended 
to third-parties and have a strong signalling effect to collective bargaining at the company 
level.  However,  plant-level  recognition  agreements  are  the  second  pillar  of  collective 
bargaining in South Africa (see Nel 2002). In summarising this brief survey, industry-wide, 
intermediate  sectoral-regional  bargaining  is  most  important  in South  Africa  with  a  strong 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, there is a huge literature on the effects of institutions on economic growth. However, none of 
theses  studies  cover  institutions  of  the  macro-economic  governance  structure  but  bureaucracies  and  their 
efficiencies, property rights systems and the like. For an overview see Aron (2000). 
25 See e.g. Swanepoel (2004: 736ff.). Moreover, the Reserve Bank of South Africa is a private institution, not a 
governmental or semi-public body as in most countries. 
26 Taking the Balassa-Samuelson effect into account, even the seemingly high range of 3% - 6% of CPIX can be 
judged as ambitious.  
27 See SAS 2006 and Barker (2003).   13 
second pillar at the company level. In terms of our broad institutional design board, wage 
policy  in  South  Africa  may  be  portrayed  as  uncoordinated  since  the  various  Bargaining 
Councils  and  plant-level  recognition  agreements  certainly  do  not  make  up  for  an 
‘encompassing organisation’ in terms of the ability and willingness to internalise external 
effects (e.g. on inflation and employment) – but they have the strength to create such external 
effects. Additionally, strong company-level representation
28 is yet another hint to assume a 
Soskice-case wherever the company level is appropriate. 
 
4.3. South Africa’s fiscal regime 
 
It is difficult to frame a fiscal policy regime. Recently, John B. Taylor has added a fiscal rule 
to his famous monetary policy rule (see Taylor 2000: 30ff.). In this rule, he distinguishes 
between cyclical and structural deficits: 
 
actual budget balance = α(output gap) + structural budget balance 
 
where α is a parameter measuring the budget elasticity. Possible candidates for fiscal policy 
regimes would be a ‘close to balanced budget’ regime with structural deficits very low (≈ 0) 
and the actual budgetary balance to be governed by the automatic stabilisers (i.e. α[output 
gap]) – this could be termed ‘sound finance regime’ as it most certainly drives down the 
public debt ratio to zero in the long run.
29 Secondly, a fiscal policy regime may focus on 
striving for the ‘golden rule’. This would set the structural budget deficit at a level of the 
public investment ratio (i.e. structural budget balance = IG/GDP) assuming sustained public 
investment expenditure (IG/GDP > 0). The UK’s fiscal framework since New Labour took 
office in 1997, for instance, is based on such a ‘golden rule regime’ (see Balls/O’Donnell 
2002: 168ff.). An outspokenly (old fashioned standard-Keynesian) ‘anti-cyclical fiscal rule’ is 
captured by the German ‘Stability and Growth Act’ (SGA) of 1967, in which not only the 
cyclical budget balance is governed by deviations of actual GDP from its potential level (i.e. 
the output gap) but also the structural budget balance is showing discretion with respect to 
output gaps. Finally, the structural budgetary balance could be made dependent not on the 
actual output gap but on the public investment ratio (as the ‘golden rule’) which, in turn, will 
be  determined  by  the  difference  between  trend-GDP  and  the  trend  in  potential  (i.e.  full 
employment) GDP (which can be called ‘trend output gap’ for short). This elaborated version 
of  the  ‘golden  rule’  regime  can  be  termed  ‘capital  budgeting  rule’  as  proposed  by  John 
Maynard Keynes in the first place (see Keynes 1943). To summarise, we have established 
four fiscal policy regimes: 
 
 
(1)  ‘sound finance regime’:  
 
actual budget balance = α (output gap) + structural budget balance (≈ 0) 
 
(2)  ‘golden rule regime’: 
 
actual budget balance = α(output gap) + structural budget balance ( = public investment 
ratio) 
 
                                                 
28 For instance, the LRA allows for the creation of closed shop agreements which are usually seen as expression 
of  strong “local pushfullness’.    
29 According to simple fiscal arithmetic, this will be the case as long as we assume the nominal growth rate 
exceeds the ‘low’ structural deficit.   14 
(3)  ‘anti-cyclical regime’: 
 
actual budget balance = α(output gap) + structural budget balance ( = ψ[output gap]) 
 
(4)  ‘capital budgeting regime’: 
 
actual budget balance = α(output gap) + structural budget balance ( = public investment 
ratio = φ[trend output gap]) 
 
South Africa’s fiscal policy regime is part of the afore-mentioned GEAR strategy which must 
be  seen  as  a  response  to  international  financial  market’s  fear  of  the  incumbent  ANC 
government  to  use  the  national  tax  resources  for  income  redistribution  in  favour  of  their 
electorate at large scale. The answer was a strategy which, as Finance Minister Trevor Manuel 
said in parliament, was “not up for negotiations” (see Ajam 2004: 6). Taking into account that 
the ANC government in 1994 took over at a public deficit of about 7%, the fiscal policy 
stance of the first post-apartheid decade has been termed as ‘conservative’ and ‘austere’ even 
by an institution unsuspected of favouring prodigal budgetary behaviour as the OECD (see 
OECD  2006:  461).  The  ‘sound  finance  regime’  would  probably  fit  best  as  a  description 
although even a pro-cyclical curbing of the automatic stabilisers has been detected
30. At any 
rate, there is no sign for ‘active fiscal policy’ as mentioned in our broad institutional design 
board.     
 
To  conclude,  South  Africa’s  market  constellation  appears  to  be  characterised  by  an 
institutional setting that does not provide the pro-growth environment which the economy 
needs to create the jobs and to fulfil the expectations of government and the people.
31 The 
combination of an unaccommodating monetary policy regime, an uncoordinated, intermediate 
collective bargaining setting with strong ‘local pushfullness’ at company level and a very 
restrictive  fiscal  policy  regime,  provides  sub-optimal  conditions  resulting  in  low  growth, 
medium to low inflation (yet higher than possible in a different market constellation) and very 
high unemployment (see tab. 1).   
 
5.  Some  empirical  evidence  on  South  Africa’s  a  sub-optimal  market 
constellation  
 
Before we will take a closer look at empirical evidence for the explanations put forward here, 
let us extract some hypothesis: We would not only expect (1) a relatively
32 low growth rate 
and high unemployment for South Africa, we would also expect (2) relatively high interest 
rates which will cause (3) low private investment spending. (4) Inflation will be relatively 
high, even though the SARB is non-accommodating. This is mainly so because (5) nominal 
unit labour cost (NULC) are supposed to rise quite fast since the collective bargaining system 
does not provide incentives to care for the ‘distributional margin’ consisting of productivity 
increases  and  targeted  (by  the  SARB)  inflation.  Therefore,  we  would  also  expect  (6)  an 
asymmetry  in  the  wage  setting  behaviour:  in  a  downward  direction  (i.e.  in  an  economic 
downturn), the overall economic situation (i.e. the output gap) is not supposed to have  a 
                                                 
30 See Swanepoel/Schoemann (2003) who report a primary (i.e. interest payments deducted) structural budget 
surplus as high as 6% of trend output by the end of the 1990s. 
31 The Growth and Development Summit (GDS) organised by the tripartite National Economic Development and 
Labor Council (Nedlac) in 2003 has set the target of halving unemployment by 2014; see Michie (2006: 86). 
32  ‘Relatively’  must  be  interpreted  ‘as  compared  to  a  counterfactual  situation  of  more  pro-growth  market 
constellations  (i.e.  non-accommodative  monetary  policy/  FED-strategy  and  coordinated  wage  policy)’  or  as 
compared to a country showing such characteristics.    15 
strong influence on wage settlements (since intermediate collective bargaining systems are not 
willing to internalise external conditions and are prone to ‘insider behaviour’). However, in an 
upward  direction  (i.e.  in  an  economic  upturn),  ‘local  pushfullness’  may  easily  feed  wage 
aspirations when the output gap is positive. Finally, it would be rather surprising (7) to find 
traces of cooperative behaviour in fiscal, monetary and wage policy stances. 
 
5.1. High real interest rates and low private investment 
 
There is not much dispute about the reversal in short-term real interest rates in post-apartheid 
South Africa after being negative in the 1980s (see Kahn/Farrell 2002), and their high average 
level since 1994 (see tab.2) is also widely acknowledged. Moreover, South Africa’s short-
term real interest rates are markedly higher than in most OECD countries and also most EME 
as Chile and Mexico (see tab. 3). It is basically the latter phenomenon which has contributed 
to  a  less  unambiguous  interpretation  of  South  Africa’s  interest  rate  performance:  While 
Epstein  (2002)  attributes  high  interest  rates  to  the  restrictive  monetary  policy  stance, 
Aron/Muellbauer  (2006)  partly  blame  a  monetary  policy  strategy  based  on  exchange  rate 
targeting  (during  the  earlier  part  of  the  1990s),  partly  a  country  specific  risk  premium. 
Kahn/Farrell (2002: 21; our italics) of the SARB admit that “…,current rates reflect to a 
certain extent the Reserve Bank’s overriding commitment to the inflation target”. However, 
they haste to add that a different policy stance (‘artificially low interest rates’) would merely 
result in higher inflation and higher long-term real interest rates. This seems odd since they 
cite literature (e.g. Allsopp/Glyn 1999) that pinpoints the crucial importance of policy regimes 
in the sense that has been termed ‘market constellations’ in this work.    
 



































(e – d) 
(g) 




(%  of 
GDP) 
1994  3.2  4.6  43.0  8.8  12.33  3.53  15.2 
1995  3.1  4.5  48.3  8.7  14.50  5.80  15.9 
1996  4.3  4.6  49.5  7.3  15.90  8.60  16.3 
1997  2.7  3.8  48.5  8.6  16.75  8.15  16.5 
1998  0.5  2.3  48.0  6.9  19.38  12.48  17.1 
1999  2.4  2.0  48.0  5.2  17.78  12.58  15.5 
2000  4.2  1.9  45.6  5.4  11.81  6.41  15.1 
2001  2.7  1.4  42.0  5.7  11.00  5.30  15.1 
2002  3.7  1.1  41.3  9.2  12.10  2.90  15.1 
2003  3.0  2.0  35.8  5.8  11.66  5.86  16.0 
2004  4.5  1.5  35.7  1.4  11.30  9.90  16.5 
2005  5.1  1.0  35.7  3.4  n.a.  n.a.  17.1 
Notes: n.a. = not available 
Source:  South  Africa  Survey  2004/05,  Johannesburg  2006;  SARB  monthly  bulletin  time 
series 
 
The low level of private investment has already been mentioned and its importance for the 
low growth and disappointing employment performance of the South African economy has   16 
also been highlighted above: The private investment share declined from 24.9 % of GDP in 
1980s to 15.8% during the period 1994 - 2004. This is not only low in historical perspective, 
but also from an international perspective: in the latter period, the private investment share in 




Table 3: Short-term real interest rate differential 
(South African real rates minus foreign real rates) 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
SA-USA  1.8  4.0  7.6  4.8  9.5  4.0  4.1 
SA-
Germany 
1.4  3.6  7.8  6.2  9.9  4.7  4.5 
SA-UK  1.7  3.8  6.2  4.0  8.8  3.3  3.9 
SA-
Ireland 
-3.3  -1.6  2.1  5.1  14.1  13.6  7.5 
SA-
Mexico 
-3.2  -7.0  12.6  8.3  3.6  2.0  1.0 
SA-
Chile 
0.3  0.9  3.5  1.6  2.6  1.6  1.3 
SA-
Korea 
5.2  5.9  9.6  6.9  16.9  4.6  4.0 
Source: Kahn/Farrell (2002) 
 
Although the restrictive monetary policy stance and the high real interest rates are certainly 
not the only factors of explanation – the high level of political and social risk
34 is always and 
rightly emphasized – the empirical literature is unambiguous about its power to explain the 
investment performance indicated in tab.1 (column g): Gibson/van Seventer (2000) as well as 
Aron/Muellbauer (2002) report statistically significant correlations using econometric models 
of the South African economy, whereas Gelb (2001) uses panel data from company studies to 
establish  a  clear  link  between  capital  cost  and  the  growth  of  firms  and  their  investment 
behaviour.  And,  finally,  Epstein  (2002)  provides  some  evidence  that  Foreign  Direct 
Investment  (FDI)  has  not  sufficiently  substituted  South  African  private  investment  as  is 
sometimes argued – he suggests a reverse causality running from higher economic growth to 
higher FDI rather than vice versa. 
 
5.2. Wage setting and inflation fighting 
 
The SARB has officially adopted an inflation targeting (IT) approach in 2000. Prior to that 
date, it pursued a ‘quantity of money’-approach (until 1997), an ‘ecclectic’ approach in 1997 
and  an  ‘informal  inflation  targeting  approach’  (1998  –  2000).  The  SARB  was  forced  to 
change its policy as the quantity approach – a target of M3-growth from 6% – 10% - created 
uncertainty about expected behaviour when the close link between M3-growth and inflation 
ruptured in the mid-1990s.
35 Firstly, an inflation target of 1% – 5% was set in addition to the 
announced target of M3-growth, later the inflation target was raised and compressed to 3% - 
                                                 
33 All dates are own calculations from European Economy, statistical annex 2006. 
34 The standing term ‘social risk’ does not maintain that developments are predictable by probability calculation. 
Therefore, ‘social risk’ really refer to a situation of fundamental uncertainty.  
35 “In recent years, however, the M3 money supply has increased at rates consistently higher than the indicated 
guideline  ranges  for  growth  in  M3,  but inflation  nevertheless declined, contradicting  previous expectations. 
Considerable  uncertainties  have  arisen  about  the  behaviour  of  the  velocities  of  circulation  of  the  various 
monetary  aggregates  and  there  were  difficulties  with  forecasting  the  relationship  between  money  growth, 
nominal income growth and inflation” (SARB 1998: 54).   17 
6%  while  the  M3-target  was  unchanged.  Finally,  the  M3-growth  target  was  completely 
abandoned while the IT target varied several times between a 3% - 6% band and a 3% - 5% 
band  (see  Aron/Muellbauer  2006).  As  can  be  seen  from  tab.  2  (column  d),  the  SARB 
succeeded in bringing inflation down from double digit figures in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Moreover, since 2000 it has almost every year kept the inflation within its targeted 
band – however, always close to the upper limit. Consumer price developments in 2004 and 
2005 seem to indicate a substantial further fall in inflation, but price movements at the actual 
margin show that inflation is trending upward again (9.9% in the III. quarter of 2006) and 
inflation expectations are steadily at about 5% - 5.5% (see SARB 2006).    
 
Assuming, as Post Keynesianism does, mark-up pricing over unit costs, nominal unit labour 
cost  (NULC)  developments  become  the  major  factor  in  determining  inflation.  If  wage 
developments and, hence, inflation were heavily dependent on output and employment gaps, a 
deflationary  outcome  would  appear  to  be  unavoidable  in  a  country  with  30%  to  40% 
unemployment. Put differently, the downward rigidity of nominal wages in the presence of 
substantial labour market disequilibria serves as a stabilising device – the nominal anchor. 
Empirical  studies  show
36  that  South  African  wage  policy  provides  that  nominal  anchor: 
neither  unemployment,  or  the  employment  rate  or  the  jobless  rate,  the  output  gap  or  the 
change in the output gap have a statistically significant impact on the inflation rate – at least 
not in a downward direction. What is crucial for the stability in a world that does not oscillate 
around  a  natural  unemployment  rate,  makes  IT  difficult:  the  lower  the  wage  and  price 
elasticity with respect to employment or output gaps (i.e. the flatter the Phillips curve), the 
more difficult it is to pursue inflation and output stability with a single monetary policy rule 
(see Carlin/Soskice 2006: 147).  
 
Table 4: Nominal unit labour cost (NULC) developments in selected countries; 2000 = 100 
  South 
Africa 
Germany  Ireland  Turkey  Poland 
1994  73.0  97.4  98.0  3.9  47.6 
1995  77.5  99.3  95.7  6.5  60.2 
1996  82.8  99.5  95.7  11.8  72.9 
1997  88.1  98.5  94.3  21.8  83.1 
1998  96.1  98.8  97.9  38.3  91.3 
1999  98.3  99.3  97.5  75.7  95.4 
2000  100  100  100  100  100 
2001  104.2  100.9  104.6  154.8  106.5 
2002  129.8  101.8  105.9  196.1  104.2 
2003  154.0  102.7  108.8  234.8  100.9 
2004  165.6  102.5  114.6  258.7  99.0 
2005  174.8  101.6  119.3  274.0  98.6 
Notes: NULC for total economy in Germany, Ireland, Turkey and Poland; NULC for the non-
agricultural sector in South Africa 
Source: SARB monthly bulletin time series; European Economy statistical annex        
 
The  influence  of  NULC  on  inflation  in  South  Africa  is  as  well  established  (see  e.g. 
Aron/Muellbauer/Smit 2003, Burger/Marinkov 2006) as the main factors determining NULC: 
past consumer price inflation, the wholesale price inflation of domestically produced goods, 
real house prices, and other minor factors (see Aron/Muellbauer/Smit 2003). As can be seen 
from tab. 4, NULC rose much faster in South Africa than in Germany, but also faster than in a 
                                                 
36 See e.g. Aron/Muellbauer/Smit (2003), Hodge (2002), Nell (2000), Burger/Marinkov (2006).   18 
catching-up country such as Ireland, or an EME such as Poland which has managed to bring 
down  inflation  more  rapidly  than  South  Africa.  Only  Turkey  –  another  EME  accession 
contender to the European Union and notorious for its bad inflation record – shows a NULC 
development worse than South Africa. Taking into consideration the differentiation between 
NULC  in  the  internationally  exposed  manufacturing  sector
37  and  NULC  in  the  domestic 
service sectors in South Africa so characteristic for EMEs, NULC developments and inflation 
performance at the upper end of the targeted inflation band needs to be accepted in the nearer 
future. 
 
Finally,  there  are  several  empirical  traces  of  local  pushfullness  and  ‘insider  behaviour’: 
Burger/Marinkov (2006: 183) as well as Nell (2000) find a statistically significant relation 
between the output gap and the change in the output gap on the one hand, and the inflation 
rate on the other hand but only in an upward direction. And Aron/Muellbauer/Smit (2003: 27) 
report “(t)he other striking finding is how dominant are the concerns of workers in wage 
setting rather than of firms.” In a Post Keynesian conflicting claims framework portrayed in 
figure 2, this implies a very high NAIRU. 
  
5.3. Trace of policy coordination? 
 
Although wage policy is crucial for inflation developments and inflation (past experience as 
well as inflation expectations) is important for wage setting, there are certainly no signs of 
institutionalised  coordination  of  both  policies  in  South  Africa.  Moreover,  the  findings 
reported above rather strongly suggest an implicit non-coordination (i.e. conflict at the actor’s 
level). 
 
In  a  recent  paper,  the  SARB  researcher  Swanepoel  (2004:  734)  argued:  “The  close 
relationship between monetary and fiscal policies carries with it the possibility of conflict and 
sub-optimal policies,… . Coordinated monetary and fiscal policies are extremely important as 
uncoordinated policies could potentially slow the economy’s long-term growth rate or cause 
unwanted  surges  in  inflation”.  Having  pinpointed  the  need  for  coordination  and  the 
consequences of its failure, Swanepoel convincingly shows that the macro-economic policy 
mix  in  post-apartheid  South  Africa  has  been  un-coordinated.  Moreover,  the  lack  of 
coordination  appears  to  be  more  pronounced  in  times  of  slack  growth  than  in  times  of 
prosperity,  i.e.  Government  and  the  SARB  cooperate  better  in  breaking  a  boom  than  in 
pushing out of a slump. The conclusion is straightforward: “The challenge is to ensure that the 




6. By way of conclusion: Towards a pro-growth social contract 
 
Once the interdependence of macro-economic policies has been recognised, neither monetary 
nor fiscal or wage policy can independently achieve the targets consigned to them: sustained 
growth  (and  high  employment)  under  the  conditions  of  price  stability.  The  common 
‘Tinbergen rule’ reminds us of the need of at least as many policy instruments as there are 
non-complementary  targets  (see  e.g.  Epstein  2002:  34).  Since  independence  has  been 
bestowed on the involved actors (the SARB, the Finance Ministry, the Social Partners) for 
                                                 
37 Where the NULC index in 2005 is 122.4; see SARB monthly bulletin time series.  
38 Two things remain unanswered in Swanepoel (2004): (1) Why does he not distinctively draw the conclusion 
that post-apartheid South Africa has suffered from an un-coordinated macroeconomic policy mix and (2) how 
can  his  vehement  argumentation  for  coordination  be  translated  into  a  traditional  policy  assignment  which 
advocates later (Swanepoel 2004: 735f.)?    19 
good reason, so cooperation among them is necessary to solve the problem. But cooperation 
requires institutional incentives to overcome strategic action traps: (1) communication must 
be  institutionalised,  (2)  policy  rules  for  cooperative  behaviour  must  be  established,  (3) 
credible monitoring and sanctioning devices must be designed.   
 
South  Africa  requires  a  social  contract  (or  concerted  action)
39  among  the  main  macro-
economic policy actors to engage in cooperation geared at low real interest rates, investment-
oriented, sustainable fiscal expansion and moderate nominal wage increases that permit a 
reduction  in  industry-wage  differentials  and  the  acceptance  of  a  distributional  margin  to 
stabilise  NULC.  A  macro-economic  dialogue  organised,  for  instance,  by  the  National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) can become the institutional basis for 
such  a  social  contract.  Employment-friendly  monetary,  fiscal  and  wage  policy  rules  are 
available (see Heise 2001, Epstein 2002) and an academic advisory council consisting of 
trusted experts of the parties involved could serve as monitoring body. Sanctioning, however, 
must  be  restricted  to  non-cooperation  in  the  next  round  of  interactions  (‘shadow  of  the 
future’) or institutional sanctions for defecting parties (‘shadow of the law’). 
 
A better coordinated, institutionally embedded macro-economic policy mix will create the 
environment for a pro-growth market constellation for South Africa. It will not be able to 
solve all the economic problems underlying South Africa’s low growth performance
40 but it 
will produce the means and resources (in terms of taxes) to invest in better infrastructure, 
human and social capital which will help to overcome existing supply-side restrictions pari 
passu.     
                                                 
39 It has been pointed out to us that ‘social contract’ may be a misnomer with respect to marketing the idea of 
cooperation. Therefore, ‘macro-economic dialogue’ can be taken as an easy substitute. And it should not be 
remain unmentioned that the EU governance process knows a ‘Macro-economic Dialogue’ which has exactly the 
purpose  to  establish  cooperation  among  the  macro-economic  actors.  For  its  (poor)  performance  see  Heise 
(2002a).  
40  For  two  very  different  accounts  of  the  challenges  ahead  and  possible  policy  proposals  see 
Frankel/Smit/Sturzenegger (2006) and Pollin/Epstein/Heintze/Ndikumana (2006).    20 
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